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Abstract
This paper uses data of the Turkish banking sector to investigate whether the 
stance of monetary policy has an impact on the level of risk of individual bank loans. 
Using bank level quarterly data over the period 2003q1-2012q3 a dynamic panel 
data model is estimated. There is a positive relationship between the changes in short-
term interest rates and banks risk taking. This result reflects that a decrease in short 
term interest rates has a positive impact on the loan portfolio via outstanding loans. 
However, negative relationship was found between the interest rate falling below 
benchmark rate and the risk taking by banks. The magnitude of this effect decreases in 
the large scale and high liquidity level of the banks. According to these results, it was 
concluded that low interest rates in Turkish banking system affects risk taking of the 
banks in the period of 2003q1-2012q3. These results are important for developing and 
conducting monetary policy. This study adds to the literature on risk-taking channel 
by providing evidence from an emerging market. Moreover, benchmark rate obtained 
by estimating Taylor rule for the above-mentioned period.
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TÜRKİYE’DE PARA POLİTİKASININ RİSK ALMA  
KANALLARI VAR MI?
Özet
Bu çalışma, Türkiye’deki bankacılık verilerini kullanarak, para politikası 
duruşunun bankaların bireysel kredi verme risk düzeyleri üzerinde etkisi olup 
olmadığını araştırmaktadır. Bankaların 2003q1-2012q3 çeyrek yıllık dönemi verileri 
kullanılarak dinamik panel veri modeli tahmin edilmiştir. Buna göre kısa vadeli faiz 
oranlarındaki değişim ile bankaların risk yüklemimleri arasında pozitif bir ilişki 
vardır. Bu sonuçlar kısa vadeli faiz oranlarında bir düşüş olduğunda bankaların geri 
dönmeyen portföyleri üzerinde olumlu etkisi olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak, 
gösterge oranının altına düşen faizler ve bankaların risk yüklenimleri arasında negatif 
ilişki bulunmuştur. Bu etkinin büyüklüğü, büyük ölçekli ve likidite seviyesi yüksek 
bankalarda düşüktür. Bu sonuçlara göre, 2003q1-2012q3 döneminde Türk bankacılık 
sisteminde düşük faiz oranları bankaların risk yüklenimlerini etkilediği sonucuna 
varılmıştır. Bu sonuçlar, para politikası geliştirilmesi ve yürütülmesi için önemlidir. 
Bu çalışma, risk yüklenim kanalı üzerine gelişmekte olan bir piyasa çerçevesinde 
ele almaktadır. Ayrıca çalışmada ilgili dönem için gösterge faiz oranı Taylor kuralı 
çerçevesinde tahmin edilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Para Politikası, Geri Dönmeyen Krediler, Risk Yüklemin 
Kanalı. 
JEL Sınıflaması: E22.
1. Introduction
In the studies prior to the global financial crisis, it was emphasized that 
financial market conditions have insignificant effects on macroeconomic variables 
or monetary policy transmission mechanisms. According to this, the central banks 
directed to control inflation rate can also resolve financial instability at the same time. 
Global financial crisis cause changes in this orthodoxy. It was emerged that Greenspan 
policies implemented at the first half of 2000’s may increase the instability in financial 
markets by promoting  risk taking behaviour of economic units. Some arguments are 
built to see the fundamental factors behind the global financial crisis.1
2. Theoretical Background of the Risk-Taking Channel
Role of the banks has been examined mainly within the framework of “bank 
lending” in the traditional monetary policy transmission channel literature.2 
1 In some of the studies, while it was emphasized that expansionary monetary policies are the 
main reason of global financial crisis and excessive loan expansion (Taylor, 2009), on the 
other hand, in some of the studies, it was asserted that the monetary policies implemented 
did not have effect of the financial crisis. (Bernanke 2010; Dokko et al., 2011; Svensson 
2010).
2 Two conditions should be satisfied for functioning bank lending. First one is that the 
expenditure of the borrowers depends on loan supply of the banks. Second one is that loan 
57
In the bank lending channel, expansionary monetary policies affect loan 
supply of the banks by increasing bank reserves and bank deposits. However, recently 
financial restrictions cause transmission channels working in a different ways by 
affecting transmission mechanisms functioning. Whereas, expansionary monetary 
policies do not only bring about an increase in loan supply as it is emphasized in 
traditional approach, it also increases the risk undertaken by the banks. Within this 
framework, in the transmission of monetary policies, banks have undertaken a new 
function through risk taking3. 
The designation of the risk taking channel of monetary policy first appeared in 
Borio and Zhu (2012. p. 242); who pointed out explicitly this transmission mechanism 
defined as “the impact of changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-
tolerance and hence on the degree of risk in the portfolios, on the pricing of assets, 
and on the price and non-price terms of the extension of funding.” In this respect, the 
risk taking channel generated by a greater appetite for risk by financial institutions 
will be exist.
Recently, various authors like Borio and Zhu (2012), Rajan (2005), De Nicolo 
et al (2010), Adrian and Shin (2010), identify and find evidence of the existence of 
a new monetary policy transmission channel denominated the risk-taking channel. 
These authors have identified some mechanisms through which this channel operates. 
One of these mechanisms is the impact of interest rates on valuations and asset 
prices. According to Borio and Zhu (2012), due to low interest rates the increase in 
valuations and in the asset prices, increases the net worth of economic units. This 
increase in net worth may have two effects. One of them is that borrower’s net worth 
increases, change risk estimations of banks’. When monetary policy is put into effect 
expansively banks might engage in lending relations with borrowers perceived as 
risky in the past. According to Gaggl and Valderarma (2010, p. 36), “if the risk taking 
channel exists, it will potentially reinforce or amplify monetary policy decisions. Thus, 
an expansive monetary policy, for instance, will become even more expansive due to 
changes in the risk attitude of lenders”. Another effect is that increases occurring in 
net worth, reduces the borrowers’ probability of default by increasing collateral value. 
The other way through which the risk taking channel operates is through the 
“search for yield”, which occurs mainly through the asset side of financial institutions’ 
balance sheet. A decrease in interest rates decreases their portfolio income and then 
may lead to a search-for-yield by financial intermediaries (Rajan, 2005).
According to Rajan (2005), expansionary monetary policies decreases returns 
obtained from short term assets by considering long term commitments of financial 
institutions like insurance companies and pension funds. In case returns obtained from 
supply of the banks is affected by the reserve changes emerged as a result of monetary 
policy changes (Bernanke and Blinder 1988). 
3 Risk taking channel is consistent with the point of view having “extensive” definition 
including financial stability in the responsibility area of central banks. This new 
transmission channel is the improved version of theoric framework – financial stability 
hypothesis - asserted by Minsky (1986).  
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investment instruments composed of risk free assets remain at low levels for a long 
time, continuation of such investments cause nonfulfilment of long term liabilities of 
financial institutions.  Tendency towards risky and high yield financial assets increases 
the probability to have higher returns for financial institutions. In this process called 
risk shifting, financial institutions incline to realize their return expectations by 
disregarding the risk of loss. During the period which the interest rates are low, the 
pursuit of risk of financial institutions increases, and when the interest rates increase, 
financial institutions become more conservative.
Another way through which the risk taking channel operates is through the 
effect of communication policies and the reaction function of the central bank (Borio 
and Zhu 2012). In this process, capability of central banks for managing short term 
inflation expectations and inflation rate is especially important. In this context, 
transparency and predictability of monetary policies decrease both the uncertainty 
related to the variation in inflation and short and long term interest rates and 
accordingly in financial market prices.
In the countries having low interest rates for quite a long time, another factor 
affecting risk taking of the banks is the moral risk. However, under the influence of 
moral risk, banks incline to finance the projects having negative net present value by 
lending most of the liquidity (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). Essential factor causing 
moral risk effect is the expectations about strong reaction to be shown by the central 
banks against negative shocks. This expectation became more important in the recent 
period and reflected in the literature as “Greenspan effect – put-”. When banks expose 
to a shock threatened the stability of the financial system, and they expect from central 
bank to lower the interest rate aggresively, they will incline to undertake higher risk. 
Accordingly, essential reason of the formation of moral risk is the commitment stating 
interest rates will be implicitly kept low instead of having low interest rates (De 
Nicolo et al, 2010). 
Another way through which the risk taking channel operates is the excessive 
expansion of banks’ balance sheets through leverage. Adrian and Shin (2010) suggest 
that banks actively manage their leverage in response to changes in asset values. 
According to this study, depending on the increase in asset prices banks expand their 
balance sheets through collateralized borrowing during periods of expansive monetary 
policies.
Concurrent with these theoretical developments, in the following part, 
empirical literature will be presented. 
3. Survey of the Empirical Literature 
The academic literature on the risk taking channel examines whether banks 
extend relatively larger loans to riskier borrowers during periods of low interest rates. 
Most of these empirical studies have found evidence that banks increase lending to 
riskier borrowers when interest rates are low.  There are two broad types of studies: 
those using macro data that try to capture the link between monetary policy and risk 
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behavior.4  The list of papers that use micro data to study bank behavior has been 
increasing rapidly in the recent past. These studies focus mainly on providing micro-
level panel evidence for the effect of changes in policy rates on individual banks’ 
lending behavior. The remaining part of this section we summarise these studies.
The first empirical investigations of the impact of monetary policy on bank 
risk behaviour belonged to Jiménez et al. (2008). This paper uses data of the Spanish 
banks over the period 1984–2006. Using a variety of duration models and time to 
default as a measure of risk, their empirical results reveals that lower interest rates 
raise the probability of default on new loans but reduce that on outstanding loans. 
According to Jiménez et al. (2008), risk taking is higher in banks with small sized and 
higher liquidity levels. 
Iannidou et al. (2009), studied the impact of the federal funds rate on the 
riskiness and pricing of new bank loans in Bolivia between 1999 and 2003. They found 
evidence that a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination raises 
the default on new bank loans. Their analysis reveals that expansionary monetary 
policy increases the risk-taking appetite of banks. Moreover, larger banks, with less 
capital and more liquid assets take on more risk when the federal funds rate decrease. 
Altunbaş et al (2010) use an interest rate gap  in order to measure the effect of 
monetary policy stance on banks risk taking, using balance sheet data for a sample 
of banks  from EU-15 and the U.S. between 1998 and 2008.They provide empirical 
evidence that a period of short-term interest rates below a benchmark level, increases 
financial fragility. They use Expected Default Frequency (EDF) as a measure of risk 
variable. They found positive relation between size and risk-taking. However, liquid 
and well-capitalized banks are found to be less risky. Those results differ from Jiménez 
et al (2008) and Ioannidou et al (2009).
Using a database of listed banks from the European Union and United States 
developed by Altunbaş et al. (2010), Gambacorta (2009) states that when interest rates 
are low for an extended period banks’ EDFs tend to increase. The results confirm 
the existence of a risk-taking channel. All other things being equal, liquid and well 
capitalised banks are less risky. 
Using data from commercial banks operating in Brazil over the period from 
2003 to 2009, Tabak et al. (2010) conclude that lower interest rates lead to an increase 
in banks’ credit risk taking.  They found that size and liquidity have a positive relation 
with risk. Large and liquid banks present a higher credit risk exposure. On the other 
hand, they found that well-capitalized banks have a lower risk exposure.  
Lopez et al. (2010) employs a dataset from the Credit Register from Colombia 
over the period 2000-2008. This paper finds a statistically significant link between 
interest rates and banks’ risk taking. Lower interest rates increase the probability of 
default on new loans and reduce that on outstanding loans. They find that small and 
highly leveraged banks are more willing to take risks.
4 Angeloni et al. (2010); Eickmeier and Hoffman (2010 ) Bekaert et al. (2010). Another 
group of studies utilize both macro and micro level data in their analysis. For instance De 
Graeve et al. (2008); De Nicolo et al. (2010).
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The first empirical study in Turkey about risk taking channel was carried out 
by Özsuca and Akbostancı (2012). Using 53 quarterly bank level data over the period 
2002-2012, Özsuca and Akbostancı find evidence that low levels of interest rates have 
a positive impact on banks’ risk-taking behavior. Specifically, low short term interest 
rates reduce the risk of outstanding loans; however short term interest rates below a 
benchmark level increase risk-taking of banks. Regarding bank characteristics, they 
find that large, liquid and well-capitalized banks are less vulnerable to risk-taking. 
According to these above mentioned empirical papers, periods of low interest 
rates would favor a risk taking channel of monetary policy whereby bank risk appetite 
and risk taking behaviour would be stronger after. 
4. Model and Methodology
In the study, dynamic panel data analysis was applied to determine the effect of 
changes of monetary policies on the risk taking of banks. Three ranges of models are 
going to be used in order to state whether risk taking channel works or not in Turkish 
banking system. To identify the model ranges, studies of Tabak et al. (2010), Özsuca 
and Akbostancı (2012), were selected as a base.
In our study, in the framework of Model I, the effects of bank-specific 
characteristics on attitudes of banks risk-takings are going to be stated. We also 
also investigate whether monetary policy has a differential impact for banks of size 
(SIZE), liquidity(LIQ) and capital strength (CAP).(Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Kishan 
and Opiela, 2000).
According to this context, Model I has been identified as following:
        (1)
In first equality, with  i = 1,2,3,..., N  where N is the number of banks; t has 
shown,  t = 1,2,3,..., T  for quarter period. Model I will be used with purpose to 
determine effects of particular bank characteristics on non-performing loans. The 
variables used in Model I are as follows: ∆NPLit is the variation of bank’s non-
performing loans divided by total loans of bank i at time t. This rate is a basic indicator 
which is used to state fragility level of banks5. SIZEit–1 is the log of the total assets of 
banks; LIQit–1 represents liquidity and is measured by proportioning of liquid assets 
to total assets; CAPit–1 stands for capitalization, measured by the equity ratio over 
assets.  
Different results have been approached when studies on effects of bank size, 
liquidity and capitalization level on risk taking are examined. Therefore, indicators of 
parameters that contain particular bank characteristics are uncertain.
5 See; Buch et al, (2010); Tabak et al, (2010); Delis and Kouretas, (2011); Özsuca and 
Akbostancı, (2012).
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According to Altunbaş et al. (2010), the main problem of measuring the impact 
of low interest rates on bank risk taking is to separate the effects of changes in mone-
tary policy rates on the risk of outstanding loans and, bank’s incentive to take on new 
risk. Reduction in interest rates affects lending portfolios positively by reducing pos-
sibility of default on economic units. On the other hand, a reduction of the interest rate 
below the benchmark rate causes a negative effect. To overcome of this identification 
problem, change in the monetary policy rate and the deviation of the interest rate from 
a benchmark level should be added to the model. 
According to this context, Model II has been identified as following:
        (2)
In equation (2), ∆NPLit  has shown changes in the monetary policy indicator. 
Interbank money market rates have been used as a measure of monetary policy stance6. 
TGAPt has shown the difference between the actual nominal short-term interest rate 
and that generated by a standard “Taylor rule”. Finally, in order to determine effects 
of macroeconomic conditions on risk taking of the banks, variation in gross domestic 
income (∆GDPt) has been taken into consideration as control variable. 
Due to the fact that decrease in interest rates is expected to decrease non-
performing loan volume, sign of γ parameter has been predicted to be positive. In 
model, deviation from benchmark value of interests (TGAP) has been given place to 
take account of effect of tendency to risky new credits of banks on non-performing 
loan volume. When interest rates fall below benchmark rate, there will be increase 
in non-performing loans of bank. Therefore, the sign of δ is expected to be negative.
Effect of ∆GDPt variable on non performing loans is not explicit. For example, 
better economic conditions may cause decrease in credit risk of the bank. Therefore, 
the sign of θ is expected to be negative. However, in some circumstances, when 
increase in GDPt is directed to the risky loans of banks, θ parameter may have positive 
value.  
Interaction variables that represent relationship between monetary policy and 
particular bank characteristics reflect distributional effects according to subjected 
characteristics of monetary policies. Model III will be used where interaction variables 
are included to analyse whether risk taking of banks change or not according to bank 
characteristics within this scope.
According to this context, Model III has been identified as following:
6 Tabak et al, (2010); Delis and Kouretas, (2011); Özsuca and Akbostancı, (2012), Wimanda 
and Turner (2012).
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     (3)
Risk taking is expected to be rather low against monetary policy changes 
banks which are great-scale, have high liquidity level and well capitalized. Therefore, 
interaction parameters are expected to be positive since banks which are great-scale 
and have high liquidity level and well capitalized can avoid itself from effect of 
monetary policy shocks, presumably. 
5. Data and Emprical Results
Unbalanced panel data approach that covers 2003q1-2012q3 period is used 
to set forth monetary policies effect on risk taking of banks in Turkey at our study. 
Quarterly data were used to determine short-term effects of monetary policies on risk 
takings of banks. Financial statements like liquidity, total loan, non-performing loans 
and liquid assets of banks were taken from the Banks Associations Union of Turkey 
(TBB). Interbank money market interest rates and gross domestic product data that 
used in this study were obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS). Sample 
volume covers 32 banks. 
Moreover, all variables that are used to estimate Taylor rule were obtained 
from International Financial Statistics (IFS). The targets for the inflation rate, 2002 
(35%), 2003 (20%), 2004 (12%), 2005 (8%), 2006 (5%), 2007: (4%), 2008: (4%), 
2009: (7.5%), 2010: (6.5%), 2011: (5.5%) and 2012: (5%) were obtained from Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) website7. The seasonally adjusted industrial 
production series (IPS) was used for the measure of output gap. The definition of 
the output gap is a detrended IPS by Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filtering. These data are 
available from the CBRT. Taylor rule estimation results are presented in Table 1:
Table 1: The Estimation Results of Taylor Rule for Turkey
a b γ
Coefficients 13.2790 1.3053 0.1864
Std. Errors (0.0574) (0.0064) (0.0035)
Probability [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
J-statistic 0.1859
Note: The instruments variables are four lagged values of the related variables.
7 Yazgan and Yılmazkuday (2007) method was adopted at transformation of subjected data.
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Table 2 indicates estimation results of equation (1)-(3) with Arellano-Bond 
(1991). Three different models have taken account into whilst given results in Table 2 
are examined. Model I reports our baseline regression results contains particular bank 
characteristics’ effects on non-performing loans. In Model 2, the effects of changes 
in interbank money market rates, TGAP and GDP on non-performing loans have 
been revealed. Model III presents the results obtained from the estimation of equation 
(3) and shows the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk-taking due to 
individual bank characteristics.
Table 2: Estimation results of Eq. (1)-(3)
Depended Variable:
∆NPLit
Model I Model II Model III
∆NPLit
-0.2269 a
(0.0790)
-0.2393a
(0.0778)
-0.2390a
(0.0779)
∆MPt -
2.9381 a
(0.5795)
2.6444 a
(0.7636)
TGAPt -
-0.7491 b
(0.3368)
-0.6115 c
(0.3368)
∆GDPt -
-0.0107 a
(0.0029)
-0.0097 a
(0.0033)
SIZEit–1
-0.0264 b
(0.0104)
-0.0467 a
(0.0101)
-
CAPit–1
-0.0197 a
(0.0024)
-0.0219 a
(0.0024)
-
LIQit–1
-0.0057 b
(0.0029)
-0.0063 a
(0.0029)
-
SIZEit–1  * TGAPt - -
0.0060 a
(0.0015)
CAPit–1  * TGAPt - -
0.0010 a
(0.0003)
SIZEit–1  * TGAPt - -
-0.0003
(0.0003)
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.3705 0.3238 0.3757
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)
0.0000
0.2278
0.0000
0.1284
0.0000
0.8498
Note: a Significant at the 1 % level, b Significant at the 5 % level, c Significant at the 10 % level. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Two tests have been used to determine validity of estimated models before 
commenting on estimation results at Table 2. Sargan and AB tests indicate convenience 
of all three estimated models. Moreover, time effect is considered to have under 
control of non-observed temporal shocks which affects risk taking of banks at all 
three estimated models. 
The effects of changes in short-term interest rates’ (∆MPt) on dependent 
variable is seen to be positively and statistically significant at both models (Model II, 
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Model III) when results of estimated models at Table 2 were examined. This means 
that a decrease in short term interest rates has a positive impact on the loan portfolio 
quality of banks. In other words, when interest rates are decreased, a decrease at non-
performing loans of banks set forth since economic units will easily pay outstanding 
loans. Therefore, risk taking of banks will be decreased. This obtained parameter is 
convenient to expectations and literature (Jiménez et al. 2008; Altunbaş et al. 2010; 
Özsuca and Akbostancı 2012).
The Taylor gap (TGAP), has a negative and significant coefficient. This 
result implies that when short-term interest rates are below a benchmark level, banks 
increase their risk-taking. This finding is consistent with Altunbaş et al. (2010) and 
Özsuca and Akbostancı (2012). 
A negative relationship is observed between changes in GDP and non-
performing loans of banks at models (Model II, Model III). Indication of related 
parameter is significantly negative. Accordingly, increased income is creating a 
reverse effect on non-performing loan of banks. Economic units that are in debt to 
bank will pay their loans easily when economic conditions of country are improved. 
Thus, risk taking of banks will decrease since non-performing loans that banks are 
after decrease.
Banks’ specific characteristics (SIZEit–1, LIQit–1, CAPit–1) are important 
determinants of  banks’ risk taking. In Table 2 reports that the three bank-specific 
characteristics are significantly negative. The negative coefficient of the size variable 
implies that larger banks take on lower levels of non-performing loans. In other words, 
portfolio structure of larger banks is more qualified according to smaller banks. This 
result differs from Tabak et al. (2010) and Altunbaş et al. (2010). They found positive 
relationship between bank size and risk. Our result is in line with, Jiménez et al. 
(2008), Lopez et al. (2010), Delis and Kouretas (2011) and Özsuca and Akbostancı 
(2012).
The coefficient of liquid assets to total assets is negative and significant. This 
parameter shows that non-performing loans of banks that have high liquidity are low. 
So, these types of banks invest on more safe instruments at market and when they 
come across with unexpected situation, they convert their assets to cash immediately. 
Accordingly, banks at Turkey are doing their activities at non-risky fields as much as 
possible. This result differs from Jiménez et al. (2008) and Iannidou et al. (2009), who 
find positive relationship between bank liquidity and risk, whereas it is in line with 
Gambacorta (2009) and Altunbaş et al. (2010) and Özsuca and Akbostancı (2012).
Third of specific characteristics of banks is capitalization level. Capitalization 
parameter is significant and negative like other two characteristics. This result reveals 
that in the Turkish banking system, well-capitalized banks are considered less risky 
by the market. Furthermore, when analyzing the results, the coefficient of size 
variable is larger than that of capital and liquidity variables. This means bank size 
is the determining indicator in related period in Turkey in terms of banks risk taking 
behaviour. This result is in line with Özsuca and Akbostancı (2012).
Finally, in order to indicate the distributional effects of changes in monetary 
policy stance on bank risk due to individual bank characteristics interaction terms 
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are included. When analyzing estimation results, the coefficients of the interactions 
between the Taylor rule gap and bank characteristics (SIZEit–1 *TGAPt  and CAPit–1 
*TGAPt) are positive significantly. However, the coefficient of the interaction 
between the Taylor rule gap and liquidity (LIQit–1 *TGAPt) was found statistically 
insignificant. 
Accordingly, when the interest rates deviate from benchmark rate, affecting 
degree of the banks risk taking differentiates according to their size and capitalization 
level. When the interest rates decrease below the benchmark rate, large banks decrease 
their risk taking. As this is not the case for smaller banks, their risk appetite increases 
when interest rates are below the benchmark rate. Interaction term of capitalization 
with the Taylor rule gap shows that more capitalized banks decrease their risk taking 
when interest rates are below the benchmark rate. In other words, the impact of low 
interest rates on risk-taking would be weak for banks with strong capitalized.
6. Conclusions
Risk taking channel causes extension of effects of monetary policy decisions. 
When considered in this context, expansionary monetary policies have wide effects 
due to the amendment in risk perceptions of the banks. Risk taking channel adds a 
new dimension to the connection between financial stability and monetary policy. 
According to recent literature, periods of low interest rates would favor a risk taking 
channel of monetary policy whereby bank risk appetite and risk taking behaviour 
would be stronger after. 
In our study, it was concluded that low interest rates in Turkish banking system 
affects risk taking of the banks in the period of 2003q1-2012q3. Accordingly, when 
short term interest rates decrease, the risk of outstanding loans reduces. In other words, 
when interest rates are decreased, a decrease at non-performing loans of banks set 
forth since economic units will easily pay outstanding loans. Therefore, risk taking of 
banks will be decreased. However, when the interest rates decrease below benchmark 
rate, risk taking of the banks increases due to the tendency towards new risky loans. 
When handling the issue within the framework of bank characteristics used in order to 
determine distributional effects of monetary policies, size and capitalization variables 
are considered as significant. 
A negative relationship is observed between changes in GDP and non-
performing loans of banks at models. Accordingly, increased income is creating a 
reverse effect on non-performing loan of banks. Economic units that are in debt to 
bank will pay their loans easily when economic conditions of country are improved. 
Thus, risk taking of banks will decrease since non-performing loans that banks are 
after decrease.
Hereunder, when interest rates deviate from benchmark rate, the reaction 
differentiates according to the size of the bank and capitalization level. In other words, 
the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking is not equal for all banks. Small sized 
and low liguidity level banks take on more extra risk than other banks when interest 
rates are low. These results are important for developing and conducting monetary 
policy.
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